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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 07-2071
_____________
ROBERT SAVITSKY
v.
LOUIS MAZZELLA;
ANNE MAZZELLA, h/w
Louis V. Mazzella, Sr.,
Appellant.
_______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 89-cv-06314)
District Judge: Honorable James T. Giles
_______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 26, 2009
Before: RENDELL, AMBRO and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed March 27, 2009)
_______________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________

JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Louis Mazzella appeals an order from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denying his motion to mark as partially satisfied
the judgment that has been entered against him.
I.

Background
This case has a long history, but the facts relevant to this appeal are few. In June

1991, the District Court entered judgment for Appellee Robert Savitsky against Mazzella
for $90,000. Mazzella failed to pay the judgment, so interest accrued and was
compounded. In October 2005, Savitsky received a check for $207,000 toward
satisfaction of his judgment against Mazzella. After the payment, however, Mazzella still
owed Savitsky at least $11,129.79 1 under the judgment.
Mazzella moved to have the judgment marked as partially satisfied, noting that
Savitsky had not filed an acknowledgment with the Court that he had received payment
on the judgment. In addition, he argued that, because he had paid off the original
principal of $90,000, no additional interest should accrue on the amount still owed under

1

In his brief, Mazzella claims that the October 2005 payment reduced the amount
due to Savitsky under the judgment to $11,129.72. (Appellant’s Brief at 5.) Savitsky,
however, in his Answer to Mazzella’s Motion to Mark Judgment Partially Satisfied,
claims that Mazzella still owes him “approximately $13,000" under the judgment. (App.
at 23.)

2

the judgment. In a one-sentence order, the District Court denied Mazzella’s motion.
Mazzella filed a timely notice of appeal.
II.

Discussion 2
Mazzella raises two issues. First, he contends that the District Court abused its

discretion by refusing to mark the judgment as partially satisfied. Second, he asserts that
the District Court erred by declining to order that no further interest will accrue on the
remaining amount due under the judgment. Savitsky did not file an answering brief.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 (b)(5) grants district courts discretion to
“relieve a party ... from a final judgment, order, or proceeding ... [when] the judgment has
been satisfied.” The rule has been interpreted to allow district courts to mark judgments
as partially satisfied. See, e.g., BUC Intern. Corp. v. International Yacht Council Ltd.,
517 F.3d 1271, 1274-75 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Rule 60(b)(5) as “an appropriate vehicle
through which to seek credit against all or part of a judgment”); Kassman v. American
University, 546 F.2d 1029, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (“A motion for a credit on a judgment
should be treated as a Rule 60(b)(5) motion”).

2

The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We
have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s denial of Mazzella’s F. R. Civ. P. 60(b)
motion pursuant to U.S.C. § 1291. See Binker v. Com. of Pa., 977 F.3d 738, 744 (3d Cir.
1992) (stating that a district court’s denial of a Rule 60(b) motion is a final order over
which we have appellate jurisdiction); 11 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary
Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2871 (2d ed. 1995) (“An order denying a
motion under Rule 60(b) is final and appealable... .”).
3

Mazzella argues that he is entitled to have the judgment marked partially satisfied
and that the District Court abused its discretion by committing an error of law when it
denied his motion. But Rule 60(b) does not obligate district courts to mark judgments as
satisfied; rather it gives them the discretion to do so. See F. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (“the court
may relieve a party... .”) (emphasis added). The District Court, therefore, did not commit
an error of law by denying Mazzella’s motion. As Mazzella has not asserted any other
grounds for his claim that the District Court abused its discretion, we hold that it was not
an abuse of discretion to deny Mazzella’s motion.3
In addition, the District Court was correct to refrain from ordering that no further
post-judgment interest would accrue. How interest accrues on money judgments
recovered in district courts is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1961. Under § 1961, interest on
judgments is “computed daily to the date of payment.” 28 U.S.C. § 1961(b). Because the
judgment has not been paid in full, under 28 U.S.C. § 1961, interest will continue to
accrue.4

3

To the extent that Mazzella’s appeal is based on a concern that Savitisky has not
acknowledged receiving payment, the concern is ill-founded. In Savitisky’s Answer to
Mazzella’s Motion to Mark the Judgment Partially Satisfied, filed with the District Court
and included in the Appendix prepared for this appeal, Savitisky admits to receiving a
payment of principle and interest in the amount of $207,000. (App. at 22.)
4

Whether it accrues on the basis of the amount still owing or on some other basis is
an issue that has not been presented to us and as to which we do not now opine. It is
sufficient to observe that Mezzella’s claim that no interest should accrue is unfounded.
4

III.

Conclusion
Because the District Court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to mark the

judgment as partially satisfied and was correct to refrain from ordering that no further
post-judgment interest would accrue, we will affirm its order.
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